One important problem of information systems in healthcare is the localisation and access to electronic patient records across healthcare institute boundaries, especially in an international setting. The complexity of the problem is increased by the absence of a globally accepted standard for electronic healthcare records, the absence of unique patient identifiers in most countries and the strict data protection requirements that apply to clinical documents. This article describes a protocol that allows to identify locations of patient records for a given patient and to access these records if granted, under consideration of the legal and technical requirements. The protocol combines cryptographic techniques with semantic annotation and mediation and presents a simple, web service based access to clinical documents.
Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 5 kept and maintained at the place of their creation. This means that given a patient with a disease requiring long-term treatment (such as diabetes), related clinical records may be located at one or more family doctor's practices, several specialists, labs and a number of hospitals. In particular, the patient may not even be aware of all locations where records relevant to a particular medical problem may be kept. Any protocol that attempts to make relevant clinical documents available in digital form needs to take this distributed nature of document storage into account. The advent of wide area networks such as the Internet along with various VPN (virtual private network) technologies provides a solution to the underlying problem of a digital transport connection between document requestor and document provider, but it does not solve the problem of how to locate the relevant records.
The task of locating relevant medical records is complicated by the fact that there is no unique patient identifier that could be "broadcasted" as a query in order to locate information pertaining to one patient. While countries such as Turkey, Norway or Sweden maintain a national person identifier that is commonly used as the index key for medical records, no such unique identifier is available in most other countries, for historic reasons or due to data protection regulations. This means that a query applicable to cross-border healthcare delivery can only be based on the patient demographics that are commonly available, including the patient's name, date and place of birth, sex, nationality and postal address. It should be noted that the set of demographics available may depend on the location (e. g. a national patient identifier would certainly be included in any query within a country in which it is valid) and on the patient's health condition, that is whether or not the patient is able to provide the doctor with additional information not contained in the passport or driving license which may be the only source of information available for an emergency patient. It should also be noted that spelling errors in medical record archives are not uncommon and may need to be accounted for, using for example phonetic encoding techniques. An additional challenge for cross-border application is the different Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 6 character sets used in different European countries. As an example, names of patients of Turkish origin are certainly common in German hospital information systems, since this group accounts for more than 2% of the population. However, Turkish names may contain characters not present in the Latin-1 alphabet (ISO, 1999b) commonly used by information systems in Germany since the Turkish language requires the Latin-9 alphabet (ISO, 1999a) , which means that the spelling of one name may differ depending on the character set supported by the information system.
Since medical records are generally considered to be sensitive personal information, it would neither be appropriate (or legal) for a healthcare enterprise to allow third parties to browse through the demographics of the local record archive, nor would it be appropriate if a request of the form "Hospital X is looking for prior psychiatry records for Patient Hans Friedrich Müller, born 1960-12-24 in Hamburg" was made available widely, that is "broadcasted" to all healthcare institutes in the network that might possibly have such records available. Clearly the query itself already communicates information to the recipient that needs to be protected under the applicable data protection rules, namely the facts that Mr. Müller currently receives treatment at hospital X and may have had a prior psychiatric treatment. We propose the use of control numbers along with semantic annotation and a probabilistic record linkage as a way of addressing the possible "fuzziness" of demographic data and at the same time preventing an inappropriate (i. e. premature and unlimited) communication of personal data.
Control Numbers and Record Linkage
Control numbers are a concept that is used in the epidemiological cancer registries in Germany to allow record linkage of anonymised records that describe cancer cases and are collected independently from multiple sources, as described by (Thoben, Appelrath, & Sauer, 1994) . The patient identification protocol makes use of this concept in a modified Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 7 form. The generation of a set of control numbers from a set of demographic values is performed through the following series of five processing steps, as shown in Figure 1: • Splitting: This first step initialises the process. The available demographics are split into fields that are later converted into different control numbers. As an example, the date of birth would typically be split into different components for year, month and day.
• Standardisation: This step addresses character set issues. Each component is standardised according to a set of rules that needs to be known to all parties participating in the protocol. Standardisation would typically involve conversion of names to uppercase ASCII characters, zero-padding of numbers such as day and month of the birth date and the initialisation of unknown and empty fields with well-known constants representing the concept of an "unknown" or "empty" value. The standardisation process could certainly be extended to Unicode to also cover multi-byte character sets such as Chinese or Japanese Kanji for which a conversion of names to ASCII may not be appropriate, but this topic is not further discussed within the scope of this paper.
• Phonetic encoding: Optionally, name components may be encoded with a phonetic encoding such as the Soundex coding system used by the United States Census Bureau, the Metaphone algorithm or for example the "Cologne phonetics" for the German language (Postel, 1969) . It should be noted that phonetic encoding is highly language specific and, therefore, different encodings are likely to be used in different countries. For this reason, a name component would always be converted to at least two different control numbers, one with and one without phonetic encoding.
• Message digest: Each standardised and possibly phonetically encoded field in the set of demographics is subjected to a cryptographic message digest algorithm such as MD5, SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160 in this step. Due to the cryptographic properties of this class of algorithms, it is not possible to efficiently construct a "matching" input string to a given message digest, that is the digest function is not reversible. It should be noted, Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 8 however, that the set of possible input values for patient's sex, year, month and day of birth and so forth is rather limited. A dictionary based attack would, therefore, quickly re-identify the plaintext source for these fields, along with most of the given names and family names that could also be determined by means of a dictionary attack.
• Encryption: In the final step each message digest is encrypted with a secret encryption key that needs to be known by all parties in the protocol that generate control numbers to be compared with each other. Each encrypted message digest is called a control number, and the complete set of control numbers describes the patient demographics in a form that does not allow to reproduce any plaintext field to any party that does not have access to the encryption key, but it allows for a comparison of two different sets of control numbers without the need for access to the encryption key.
Given a set of control numbers describing a query and a larger number of sets of control numbers describing all patients in a record repository, "matches" in the repository can be identified using record linkage, defined by (Winkler, 1999) as "the methodology of bringing together corresponding records from two or more files or finding duplicates within files." We propose the use of a probabilistic rather than a deterministic record linkage algorithm as described by (Jaro, 1989) as well as (Blakely & Salmond, 2002) . This class of algorithms not only compares each pair of control numbers for equality, it also considers the significance of each control number, based on an estimation of the true positive rate and the false positive rate, that is the probabilities of a pair of identical control numbers of representing the same or different patients.
The probabilistic record linkage also allows to compensate to a certain degree for missing data (control numbers that are not available at the record repository), typing errors and so forth. Basically, the algorithm allows to identify the most "promising" matches from a larger set. The final choice of records that would be treated as definitive matches depends on a threshold and, possibly, on human choice. Figure 2 shows the Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 9 graphical user interface of a tool that is used in the cancer registry of Lower Saxony in Germany to evaluate the results of a probabilistic record linkage process. We expect the result presentation to be much simpler in the case of a tool for locating and accessing clinical records, because the distinction between definitive matches and "near matches" may still be made on the basis of the clinical documents retrieved. Further issues in record linkage, such as array comparison, are discussed in (Aden, Eichelberg, & Thoben, 2004) .
Blocking Variables
The protocol as described above would require every record repository to create a set of control numbers for each patient in the repository, and to repeat this for each incoming query because of the encryption key, which would change with each request.
This of course is not practical for a large number of patients. Therefore, the protocol uses the concept of so-called blocking variables to reduce the number of possible "candidate records" for which control numbers have to be computed and evaluated. Blocking variables are simply plaintext demographics which are transmitted in unencrypted forma transport level encryption can of course be used, but the blocking variables are available to the record repository in plaintext form. Blocking variables must be carefully chosen to make sure that a patient cannot be identified from the blocking variables alone. As an example, the day of birth (not including month and year) would certainly not be sufficient to identify any specific patient, but would reduce the number of "candidates" for which control numbers would have to be computed by a factor of up to 30. Similarly, a postal code of the place of residence or the place of birth would not be sufficient to identify a patient, even when combined with the day of birth, but would significantly reduce the number of candidates in most record repositories (except for hospitals actually located at the given place, where a large number of patients may have the same place of birth or residence). The set of blocking variables needs to be carefully chosen to reduce the Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 10 number of candidate records as much as possible while avoiding the risk of exposing the patient's identity.
Semantic Annotation
As described above, we can expect different countries to use different, though certainly overlapping, sets of control numbers accounting for country or region specific aspects such as phonetic encoding or national unique patient identifiers. Since control numbers can only be compared for binary equality but not evaluated in any other way, it is of prime importance for all parties participating in the protocol to understand exactly what each control number (and each blocking variable) means and which control number is supported by which party. The use of ontology based semantic annotation allows to introduce the amount of flexibility into the protocol that is needed to make it work in an international setting where different sets of control numbers might be supported by different actors. Each request or response dataset consisting of a list of control numbers and blocking variables is encoded as a web ontology language (OWL) (Dean & Schreiber, 2004) instance that describes the demographics from which each entry was generated, as well as the processing steps that were applied to the entry. Figure 3 shows the core demographics ontology defined for this purpose. A DemographicsOntology used by a healthcare enterprise to describe the supported set of control numbers and blocking variables consists of a set of DemographicsValue entities which are either control numbers or blocking variables (the asterisk in the hasValues relationship type denotes a one-to-many relationship.) For control numbers, the processing steps are described through properties, for blocking variables the BlockVariableEncoding describes the standardisation process or value range.
Since different countries will typically use different sets of control numbers, more than one DemographicsOntology might exist. The country, region or hospital specific Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 11 demographics ontologies (called local ontologies) are defined as extensions to the core ontology. Figure 4 shows a subset of such a local ontology, describing a single blocking variable (the patient's sex) and a set of control numbers for the name components as defined in HL7. All ontology classes shown in grey with the prefix "dgo:" in their name refer to the core ontology. OWL restrictions on properties that are not shown in this figure define the algorithms used in the local ontology for standardisation, phonetic encoding, message digest and encryption. Also not shown is a binary property isUnique defined for each subclass of DemographicValue that denotes control numbers that guarantee a unique identification of the patient for a match. These properties are used to initialise the weights of the record linkage process accordingly. If the requestor and a record repository in the protocol use different local ontologies, then a direct or indirect mapping between these ontologies is used, which is available both to the record repository (for the purpose of interpreting the blocking variables) and the record linkage server, which is introduced below. A mapping would be defined as an ontology describing owl:equivalentClass relationships between ontology classes in the different ontologies, allowing for a reconciliation between the ontology instances using rather simple inference rules. Instance nodes (i. e. individual control numbers or blocking variables) for which no equivalence in the other local ontology can be found, are simply omitted from the record linkage process.
Knowledge Distribution
As described above, the security of the control numbers is based on the combination of a message digest algorithm followed by an encryption with a session key. The session key, which is randomly generated for each query, guarantees that responses from different queries cannot be compared in order to derive information from the evaluation of a large set of queries. However, the problem of "dictionary attacks" still remains: Any entity that has access to both a set of control numbers and the session key could attempt to decrypt Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 12 the control numbers and use a dictionary of names, dates and so forth to re-identify the patient described by the control numbers. In order to prevent this, a simple policy needs to be established:
Any entity in the network that has access to the session key must not be granted access to any set of control numbers except the control numbers generated by this entity itself.
This means that the initiator of a query for a specific patient (called the "requestor" in the following text) cannot receive the control numbers generated by the record repositories responding to the query. The record repositories on the other hand cannot be given access to the control numbers in the query because they need to access the session key in order to generate their own sets of control numbers for all patients matching the blocking variables. Fortunately, the record linkage process itself does not require access to the session key, only to the control numbers in the query and the responses that were pre-filtered by the record repositories using the blocking variables. Therefore, the protocol needs to introduce additional actors between requestor and record repositories in order to guarantee that no patient related information is "leaked" through the protocol before explicit authorisation has been granted. The actors and their transactions in slightly simplified form are shown in Figure 5 . The complete protocol is detailed in (Eichelberg, Aden, & Riesmeier, 2004) . • Record Linkage Server (RLS): an entity in the network that receives a set of control numbers from the requestor describing the patient to be identified and a possibly large number of sets of control numbers generated by the record repositories, based on the blocking variables and the session key. The RLS performs the probabilistic record linkage and identifies a number of "candidates", that is patient records in the record repositories that have a high probability of referring to the same patient described by the query control numbers. Once the RLS has completed its work and authorisation has been given by the record repositories (see discussion below), the set of best matches (based on a threshold value) is reported back to the requestor and this completes the patient identification process. Since the RLS does not have access to the session key, it cannot re-identify the patient demographics from the control numbers it receives. The RLS must be a trusted component in the network in the sense that both requestor and record repositories have to rely on the RLS never giving away any control numbers it receives and never trying to get hold of a session key in order to perform a re-identification of patient demographics.
• Trusted Third Party (TTP): an entity in the network that enables distribution of the query containing the session key and blocking variables among the record repositories in the network, preventing any direct communication between requestor and record repositories at this stage. The TTP can also act as a gatekeeper to the network in the sense that only requestors accepted by the TTP are able to initiate patient identification queries and only repositories accepted by the TTP are able to provide information to the RLS.
Each match retrieved by the requestor from the RLS consists of a resource identifier (e. g. URL) under which the record repository that has provided this matching record can be contacted, a set of flags indicating for each of the control numbers in the query whether or not they matched or were missing in the response, and a "candidate identifier". This is a simple numeric identifier generated by the record repository as an alias to the local Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 14 patient ID that identifies a specific patient in the context of the current query transaction, and can be used to request medical records for this specific patient.
Medical Record Access
Once a requestor has identified one or more record repositories that have clinical documents pertaining to the current patient available, the appropriate documents have to be selected, requested, retrieved and displayed. This comprises the second phase of the protocol described in this article. Since at this time no global standard for electronic healthcare records exists that could be used to provide record access in the cross-border scenario described above, we suggest to use the Retrieve Information for Display (RID) (IHE, 2004, chapter IHE interface definitions are based on "actors" (the IT systems involved in the protocol) and "transactions" (interfaces between actors). In the case of RID, the actors are called "information source" and "display". The information source, which corresponds to the record repository in the discussion above, is a system that maintains a database of persistent clinical documents and specific key patient-centric information such as allergies, current medications, summary of reports, and so forth. The display, which corresponds to the requestor, is a system that accesses the information source, retrieves patient-centric information or persistent documents, and displays them to a human observer. The focus of the integration is visual presentation, not a complete integration of the structured databases on which the actors might be based. Documents are exchanged in well-known presentation formats. Communication between display and information source is always initiated by the display and is implemented as a web service using the web services description language (WSDL) with a binding to HTTP GET.
The RID protocol is ideal for integration with the patient identification process described above because the only a-priori information that the display needs when accessing a record repository is the patient identifier. This identifier is provided by the patient identification protocol in the form of the "candidate identifier" which describes a single patient and is only valid in the context of a single query transaction. Figure 6 shows how an existing RID information source at the record repository site and an existing RID display system at the requestor site can be combined with an additional layer of middleware to provide medical record access in combination with the patient identification protocol.
On the repository site, a "simulated display" receives the incoming requests from the requestor, replaces the candidate ID generated during the patient identification Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 16 process by the real patient ID locally used in the hospital and forwards the request to the existing information source, to which this actor looks like any local display actor. Before forwarding the response back to the requestor, all hyperlinks in the response have to be replaced with links pointing to the simulated display, because these hyperlinks will typically refer to resources that cannot be reached directly from the outside world (due to firewall protection and network address translation). Subsequent requests for these mapped hyperlinks would simply be redirected from the simulated display to the original resource. In a similar manner, a hyperlink lookup scheme can be implemented on the requestor site inside the "simulated information source", to address firewall and network address translation issues. As a side effect, the two "simulated" actors can provide a secure tunnelling of the request and response message, which are usually transmitted in clear text form within a hospital, using any available transport level security protocol.
Data Protection and Patient Consent
The EU data protection directive (Council of the European Communities, 1995) and the recommendation of the Council of Europe on the protection of medical data (Council Of Europe, 1997) determine that neither person identifying data nor medical records are allowed to be exchanged between different organisations unless either the patient agrees on the exchange of the identifying data and medical records for a specific purpose, or the vital interests of the patient are touched. Therefore, in most cases an explicit patient consent will be a prerequisite to an exchange of medical records. Since the patient is most likely to be at the healthcare institute searching for and requesting to access clinical records (i. e. the requestor), the question arises how the patient consent can be demonstrated to the record repository, in particular if the exact location of the repository is unknown.
It should be noted that no information that would allow to identify a patient or derive any information about a patient is exchanged in the patient identification protocol Patient Identification based on Control Numbers 17 until the RLS provides a list of matches to the requestor, that is in the last step of the first phase of the protocol depicted in Figure 5 . This list of matches enables the requestor to identify resources (i. e. healthcare institutes) that have clinical documents for the given patient available with a certain probability. The second, more significant exchange of information takes place during the second phase of the protocol when the requestor uses the modified Retrieve Information for Display protocol to request and access clinical documents for a specific patient. Correspondingly, there are two places at which additional barriers can be installed in the protocol, barriers that would be opened automatically or manually once the patient consent had been demonstrated to the record repository:
• The requestor may deposit a proof of the patient consent at the RLS when initiating the query. The RLS would make this document available only to those record repositories that have been identified as "matches" in the record linkage and request permission to report them back to the requestor. Only repositories granting this permission would ever be reported to the requestor. 
